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Damages For Wrongful Birth
Joyce E. Barrett*
WHILE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES for wrongful death was sanctioned in
England as early as 18461 and is now available by statute in every
state,2 the law has been loathe to afford a remedy for wrongful birth.
Plaintiffs who have attempted to cope with the problem of people-
pollution by various birth control methods, only to have their ecolog-
ical efforts stymied by the negligence of a physician performing a
sterilization operation or a pharmacist dispensing birth control pills,
have been denied a remedy for what, in this writer's view, is the
"wrongful birth" of the resulting child. This paper will examine the
long, hard road of non-recovery for plaintiffs who have sought vainly,
through no fault of their own, to limit their family size through ster-
ilization and birth control pills. It has culminated in two courageous
decisions,3 which portend the demise of damnum absque injuria for
wrongful birth.
Pill Pregnancies Not Compensable
While the Supreme Court of the United States has said that birth
control is within a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" that
surrounds the marital union, and that the state may not infringe on
the right of a husband and wife to use contraceptives so as to limit
the size of their family,4 and while the great social value of "the pill"
has been hailed in this era of the population explosion, 5 still pill
pregnancies have not been compensable.
In Maley v. Armstrong,6 a negligence suit brought against two
physicians, the plaintiff contended that she became pregnant although
she took the birth control pills defendants had prescribed for her.
She gave birth to a normal, healthy child. The court held that the
plaintiff had not sustained compensable damages as a result of the
defendants' negligence, noting that:
Birth control is clearly not against public policy. However,
it would appear that if a cause of action of this particular nature
(wherein the health of the mother has not been impaired and
the child is normal and loved by the parents) should be sanctioned,
it should be by the duly elected legislature after complete public
debate. A decision of this nature involving conflicting mores and
far flung social ramifications should not depend upon the per-
sonal, religious and social views of a particular judge or jury.
*Of the Ohio Bar (Cleveland).
I Fatal Accidents Act of 1846 (Lord Campbell's Act) 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93.
2 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs 924 (3rd ed. 1964).
3 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) ; Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 B. SEAMANJ, THE DocToRs' CASE AGAINST THE PILL 239 (1969).
8 No. 83195 (Iowa, Dist. Ct. Linn County, Jan. 11, 1967).
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When a pharmacist fills a prescription, he is held to impliedly
warrant that he will deliver the drug prescribed.7 In Szczerbiak v. Fair
Drugs, Inc.,8 the defendant pharmacist was charged with negligence in
filling the plaintiff wife's birth control pill prescription. Instead of
the prescribed pills, she was given common cold tablets, and, as in
the Maley case, she conceived and gave birth to a normal, healthy
child. The plaintiffs already had several other children, and the wife
was at an age at which she desired no more. As a result of the birth,
the plaintiffs were forced to sell their mobile home and move into
larger quarters. The plaintiff wife had to give up her employment to
stay home and care for the child. The defendant pharmacist asked
for judgment on the pleadings. As to the question of whether the
public policy of Wisconsin permits the award of damages for the birth
of a well-born child and the costs incident to and following the birth,
the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County answered with a resounding
"No", notwithstanding that the pharmacist was negligent in giving
the plaintiff wife pills other than the prescribed oral contraceptives.
The court rationalized:
It goes without saying that the human race will not survive
unless children are born, and for and with the birth of children go
the problems for which plaintiffs claim damages for in this
action ....
The natural birth of a healthy child, with no injury to the
mother, is universally considered as a joyous event. This child
may rise to great heights some day....
Allowance of damages claimed in this case would "contravene
good morals" and the "established interest of society," and so
would be against public policy.
Similarly, in Coloff v. Hi Ho Shopping Center, Inc.,9 the defendant
pharmacist incorrectly filled the plaintiff wife's oral contraceptive
prescription with dehydrating pills. The plaintiffs asked damages for
the medical expenses incurred as a result of the birth of the child,
the wife's pain and suffering attendant with childbirth, the aggrava-
tion of the wife's pre-existing varicose vein condition, and the expense
of rearing the unwanted child.9a The court did at least allow the case
to go to a jury; however, the jury was only permitted to consider
damages for the medical expense attending the child's birth and the
aggravation of the wife's pre-existing varicose vein condition. The
court upheld the defendant pharmacist's contention that there could
be no damages for the rearing of the child or for the wife's pain and
suffering. The jury found the defendant pharmacist negligent and
returned an $8,000.00 verdict on the two submitted issues.
7 25 AM. JuR. 2d Drugs, Narcotics, & Poijons § 53 (1966).
8 No. 356-463 (Wis., Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Oct. 17, 1969).
9 No. 168070 (Wash., Super. Ct. Pierce County 1966).
9a It costs $30,000 to raise a child to age 18, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1,
col. 3.
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Sterilization Slip-Ups-A Blessing?
The question of whether a physician should be liable to his
patient for damages when, following the performance of a sterilization
operation for family-planning purposes, a child is born, has been con-
sistently answered in the negative. Recovery has been sought against
the physician on the bases of negligence,10 breach of contract or war-
ranty,", and fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. 12
So, in Ball v. Mudge,13 the husband underwent a vasectomy opera-
tion both for family-planning and health purposes. The physician
failed to perform post-operative testing. Recanalization (regeneration
of the severed tubes) occurred, and the plaintiff's wife became preg-
nant, giving birth to a normal child. The husband and wife brought
suit against the physician, asking damages for the expense of deliver-
ing the child and for its care, maintenance, and support. The jury
found for the defendant physician. On appeal, the court held that the
costs incident to the birth and rearing of a normal child were far
outweighed by the "blessing of the event itself". Moreover, the court
said that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that post-operative
testing in the case of a vasectomy was normal medical practice in the
community.
In Shaheen v. Knight,14 the plaintiff, already the father of four
children, sought a sterilization operation for the sole reason that he
wanted no more children. As in the Ball case, the wife became preg-
nant after the operation and the couple was "blessed" with their fifth
child. The plaintiff sought recovery on a breach of contract theory,
in that he and the defendant physician had entered into a contract in
which the defendant had agreed to make him immediately and per-
manently sterile and guaranteed the results thereof. The Pennsyl-
vania court held that a doctor and his patient are free to contract for
a particular result. If the result is not achieved, the patient has a
cause of action for breach of contract. This action is separate and
apart from a malpractice action in which negligence must be proved,
even though they may both arise out of the same transaction. How-
ever, the court said that even though the plaintiff had a valid breach
of contract action, there could be no recovery because the plaintiff
had suffered no damage. Again applying the "blessing" concept, the
court said:
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the
physician would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which
the plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of
this plaintiff's fifth child. Many people would be willing to sup-
port this child were they given the right of custody and adoption,
10 Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.2d 24-7, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
11 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 4.1 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
12 Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
13 Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
"1 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
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but according to plaintiff's statement, plaintiff does not want
such. He wants to have the child and wants the doctor to support
it. In our opinion to allow such damages would be against public
policy.15
In Christensen v. Thornby,16 the plaintiff underwent a vasectomy
because the defendant physician advised him that it would be danger-
ous for his wife to bear another child. Relying on the physician's repre-
sentation that the operation had been successful, the plaintiff resumed
sexual relations with his wife. She again became pregnant, and a
normal, healthy child was born. The plaintiff based his suit on the
misrepresentation by the defendant doctor that he and his wife could
engage in sex without fear of pregnancy. The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota, however, said that since the primary purpose of the operation
was to preserve the wife's health, not to save the expenses incident
to pregnancy and delivery, and since the wife had survived the preg-
nancy and delivery, the plaintiff had suffered no damages. Quite to
the contrary, the court said, the plaintiff had been "blessed" with
the fatherhood of another child and expressed incredulity at the plain-
tiff's seeking to charge the defendant with the cost of nurturing and
educating the child during its minority.
Blessing Becomes Bane
The underlying concept common to all of the foregoing cases is
that while there may have been an injury to plaintiffs resulting from
the tortious conduct of the defendants, this injury is not compensable,
because the birth of a healthy child confers so substantial a benefit
on the parents as to outweigh the expenses of its birth and support.
This so-called "benefit rule", which has been enunciated in the fore-
going case law as the "blessing concept", is expressed in the Restatement
of Torts as follows:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to
the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon
the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, where this is equitable.' 7
It is difficult to conceive of an unwanted birth as a blessing or ben-
efit when one is confronted with the statistics on overpopulation. For
example, whereas from 6000 B. C. to 1650 A.D. the population doubled
itself only about every thousand years,1 8 the present doubling time
is a mere thirty-five years.19
That the supposed "blessing" of childbirth could well be a bane
was finally recognized in Custodio v. Bauer20 Here, a married couple,
15 Id. at 45-46.
16 Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
17 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
18 P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 19 (1968).
19 Id. at 214.
20 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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already the parents of nine children, instituted an action against the
defendant physicians who had performed a sterilization operation
upon the plaintiff wife. Subsequently she became pregnant with her
tenth child. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the
complaint and dismissed the action. On appeal, the trial court's judg-
ment was reversed. In an opinion by Associate Justice Sims, it was
held that the complaint stated causes of action in negligence, breach
of contract, and fraud or misrepresentation. Moreover, the court
recognized that if the plaintiffs successfully established liability at
the trial, they would be entitled to "more than nominal damages."2 '
The defendants had represented to the plaintiff wife that addi-
tional children would aggravate an existing bladder and kidney con-
dition and that removal of a portion of the Fallopian tubes would
accomplish sterilization. However, the defendants failed to sufficiently
cut and relocate the Fallopian tubes so as to avoid their regeneration.
Thus, the court said that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action in
negligence for the failure of the defendants to use that degree of care
or skill ordinarily possesed by others of their profession in the same
locality. The court further found that a cause of action was stated in
that the defendants had failed to inform the plaintiff wife that the
surgical procedure was not absolute in nature and that a possibility
existed that she could thereafter become pregnant; also that the
defendants had failed to inform the wife that several surgical pro-
cedures were possible to accomplish complete sterilization, thus
depriving her of an opportunity to choose the procedure that would
render her absolutely sterile.
Regarding the breach of contract allegation, the court said that,
while a doctor is not a "warrantor of cures" or required to guarantee
the results of an operation, where there is proof of an express con-
tract the doctor can be held liable for failure to perform a promise
to effect a cure or obtain a certain result. Thus, the plaintiffs' allega-
tion that the wife and the defendant physicians had entered into an
agreement whereby the defendants had agreed in writing to sterilize
the plaintiff wife by an operative procedure was not demurrable.
Likewise, the fraud theory was held not demurrable in that the
defendants represented to the plaintiff wife that she could engage in
sexual intercourse with safety and that contraceptive devices were
no longer necessary, as she could not become pregnant; that said
representations were false and known to the defendants to be false;
and that plaintiff relied on them to her injury.
The defendants contended that the pregnancy, the ensuing birth
of a normal child, and the costs and expenses of the delivery and rear-
ing of a child were not legally cognizable injuries. They further as-
serted that any alleged breach of duty by them was not the proximate
21 Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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cause of the pregnancy because of the intervening sexual relations
between the plaintiffs!
Dealing first with proximate cause, the court said:
The general test of whether an independent intervening act,
which actively operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain
of causation is the foreseeability of that act. (citations omitted)
It is difficult to conceive how the very act, the consequences of
which the operation was designed to forestall, can be considered
unforeseeable. 22
Finally, asserting that the birth of a normal, healthy child was a
legally cognizable injury, the court said that there is a loss in that
the mother "must spread her society, comfort, care, protection and
support over a larger group. '2 3 Thus, the court said, "If this change
in the family status can be measured economically it should be . . .
compensable . ",24
In remanding the action, the court set the following guidelines
for the assessment of damages should liability be found:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the
mesure of damages . . . is the amount which will compensate for
all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not.2 5
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the
measure of damages, . . . is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved, for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be
likely to result therefrom.26
Another Blow To Damnum Absque Injuria
In Troppi v. Scarf,2 7 the defendant pharmacist incorrectly filled
a prescription for oral contraceptives and gave the plaintiff wife a
mild tranquilizer instead. As might be anticipated, the wife gave
birth to a normal, healthy child. The husband and wife sought dam-
ages for medical and hospital bills, cost of confinement, loss of earnings
of the plaintiff wife, support for the child until he reached the age
of twenty-one, and the emotional stress and strain to the plaintiff
wife incidental to the pregnancy. The trial court dismissed the action,
"reasoning" that to allow damages for the birth of a normal child
would impose upon the negligent druggist the burden of paying for
what was the result of the conjugal pleasure of the plaintiffs and for
their joy in the future in rearing and educating their eighth child.
In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
held that application of the benefit rule did not prevent recovery for
22 Id. at 316, 59 Cal. Rptr. 472.
23 Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 476.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
26 Id.
27 Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 189 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
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the expenses of rearing the unwanted child. Where the plaintiffs had
alleged the mother's lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, pain
and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth, and economic cost of rearing
a child as items of damage, assessment of damages was properly within
the competence of the trier of fact. The element of uncertainty in net
recovery did not render the damages unduly speculative. 2
To the trial court's finding that to assess damages in this cause
would be in contravention of public policy, the Appellate Court stated:
Not only does contraception not violate the public policy of
the State of Michigan, the legislature has recently enacted two
separate statutes designed to foster the use of contraceptives.2 9
Taking more wind out of the sails of the public policy argument,
the court went on to say:
Where the State's advocacy of family planning is so vigorous
as to include payments for contraceptives as part of the welfare
program, public policy cannot be said to disfavor contraception.
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy chil-
dren. To say that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure
can result in no damage as a matter of law ignores the fact that
tens of millions of persons use contraceptives daily to avoid the
very result which the defendant would have us say is always a
benefit, never a detriment. Those tens of millions of persons, by
their conduct, express the sense of the community.20
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs should have mitigated
their damages by aborting the child or placing it for adoption. The
court said that the plaintiffs were under no duty to take either of the
suggested actions, because, though an unplanned child may be un-
wanted, that does not necessarily mean that he is unloved. As the
court put it:
Many, perhaps most, persons living today are conceptional
accidents in the sense that their parents did not desire that a child
result from the particular intercourse in which the person was
conceived. Nevertheless, when the child is born, most parents
accept him with love. That the plaintiffs accepted their eighth
child does not change the fact that the birth of another child,
seven years younger than the youngest of their previously born
children, unbalanced their life style and was not desired by
them.31
Finally, the court recognized that the allowance of damages would
act as a deterrent to other potential tortfeasors by saying:
In theory at least, the imposition of civil liability encourages
potential tortfeasors to exercise more care in the performance of
their duties, and, hence, to avoid liability-producing negligent
acts. Applying this theory to the case before us, public policy
28 Id. at 261, 187 N.W. 2d at 521.
29 Id. at 252, 187 N.W. 2d at 516.
3o Id. at 253, 187 N.W. 2d at 517.
81 Id. at 258, 187 N.W. 2d at 519.
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favors a tort scheme which encourages pharmacists to exercise
great care in filling prescriptions. To absolve defendant of all lia-
bility here would be to remove one deterrent against the negli-
gent dispensing of drugs. Given the great numbers of women who
currently use oral contraceptives, such absolution cannot be de-
fended on public policy grounds.32
Conclusion
With the advent of the Custodio and Troppi decisions, it is hoped
that the "silly season" of denying damages for the birth of an actively
unwanted child has ended. Indeed, a case involving the tort of wrong-
ful birth might well be brought as a class action on behalf of all the
members of society, for the unwanted child merely adds another fuse
to the "population bomb." Overpopulation infringes upon mankind's
inalienable rights, some of which are: the right to eat, the right to
drink pure water, the right to live uncrowded, the right to avoid
regimentation, the right to breathe clean air, and the right to silence.33
Thus, instead of rewarding the tortfeasor in a wrongful birth case
by letting him go scot-free in return for the "blessing" which some
anachronistic courts feel he has conferred upon the wronged parents
and upon society as a whole, he should be saddled with the expenses
of bringing the child into this already overcrowded world and support-
ing him to maturity. As a result, the next time a pharmacist fills a
birth control prescription or a physician performs a sterilization
operation he may be just a little more careful, so as to spare society
from another "blessing" which it does not need or want.
22 Id. at 254, 187 N.W. 2d at 517.
33 P. EHRLICH, supra note 18, at 187.
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